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This article explores the emergence of 
tunnels within the Gaza Strip. It argues 
that tunnels emerged as an implicit 
response to Israeli policies of separation 
and control, and the increasingly sophis-
ticated means used to realize these ends 
during the peace process and thereafter. 
The latter included approaches that 
actively embraced a “politics of vertical-
ity,” incorporating a volume-based 
approach to Israeli geopolitical interests 
and designs. Tunnels would come to reify 
an insurgent impetus vis-à-vis Israeli ide-
ological, political and military doctrines 
on the one hand, and the structured 
dependency and ineffectiveness of the 
Palestinian Authority on the other. Their 
emergence speaks to the organization 
and coagulation of many externalities 
generated by both dynamics, which 
effectively captured existent infrastruc-
tural assemblages toward colonial imper-
atives.
Keywords: tunnels; politics of verticality; 
Gaza Strip; separation control; apartheid; 
captured infrastructure
Introduction
In January 2017, the Israeli human rights 
organization Gisha1 issued a report detail-
ing the state of the Gaza Strip’s crumbling 
infrastructure, focusing in particular on 
energy, water, sewage and communica-
tions (Gisha). The report outlines what is 
by now well established—that Gaza’s infra-
structure is in a state of advanced disrepair 
and on the verge of total collapse.2 Not 
long after the report’s issuing, top United 
Nations (UN) representatives deemed the 
territory ‘unlivable,’ advancing a 2012 esti-
mate that the critical period of unlivability 
was due to arrive in 2020 (UN 2).
While the deteriorating state of Gaza’s 
infrastructure and economy has been doc-
umented for decades (World Bank), there 
is one set of infrastructure in the Gaza Strip 
that is thriving: the elaborate tunnel infra-
structure constructed beneath Gaza’s 
sandy soils. It is here where a veritable 
warren of subterranean tunnels has been 
constructed—and continues to be con-
structed, so elaborate that some commen-
tators describe it as an ‘underground city’ 
(Zboun). While its full dimensions are not 
known (with all parties engaged in this 
activity coveting secrecy), former 
Palestinian prime minister and current act-
ing head of Hamas, Ismail Hanieyh, once 
hinted in 2016 that the Hamas network was 
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double the size of the tunnel network con-
structed by the Vietnamese National 
Liberation Front (NLF) (al- Ya’qoubi; 
al-Qutub). If Hanieh’s statement is accu-
rate, it would be an impressive feat given 
that NLF’s Cu Chi tunnel maze was 
150 miles (241 km) in length and so exten-
sive to include hospitals, resting areas, 
storage facilities, and schools (Mangold & 
Penycate 120).  
While there is no way to confirm if these 
figures are inflated for a territory only 
360km2, land borders 72km long, and a 
population a fraction the size of Vietnam’s 
during the height of its active tunnel 
empire,3 it is not impossible. The one pub-
lished Israeli source estimates the Gaza 
tunnel network at a much more modest—
but still considerable—100km, two and a 
half times the length of Gaza’s 40km coast-
line (Fishman).4 One Israeli army source 
estimates this network may be growing at 
10km a month (JPost Staff). 
The discrepancy between the state of tun-
nel infrastructure and the existing state of 
Gaza’s civilian infrastructure is a consistent 
talking point of Israeli military and political 
spokespersons. In defending its policy of 
severely restricting movement of people 
and goods into and out of Gaza—a policy 
Palestinians refer to as a ḥiṣar (siege) and 
which the United Nations describes as a 
“blockade”—Israeli commentators consis-
tently invoke the “warped priorities” that 
have led Hamas to prioritizing the con-
struction and upgrading of tunnels over 
investing in improving living conditions 
(Eldar).5 
However, the sensationalism surrounding 
tunnel discourse from both Israel and 
Palestinian military factions tends to 
obscure a more complicated history to 
this phenomenon—a history that does not 
exclusively fit the narratives of either side. 
Like all infrastructure, and consistent with 
the theme of this journal’s 10th issue, 
Gaza’s tunnels highlight “strong connec-
tions between material things, lives, and 
practice with immaterial and ideational 
aspects of human life” (META editorial, this 
issue). They equally articulate various rela-
tions of power and domination, albeit not 
in the typical manner that much infrastruc-
ture development takes place in today’s 
world. The Gaza Strip after all, like the 
entire Palestinian theatre, is under a pro-
tracted fifty-year military occupation and 
subject to a particular variant of settler 
colonialism that has many geographical 
fronts and spatial frontiers. Hamas is also 
an opposition movement within Palestinian 
politics, attempting to forge a new politi-
cal and military strategy to Palestinian 
politics overall. On both fronts—fronts 
which are by no means equal—tunnels fea-
ture as a prominent infrastructure of insur-
gency, reifying political contestations 
between Israel and Palestinians, as well as 
within intra-Palestinian political and class 
struggles. 
This article explores some of the historical, 
ideational, political, and economic forces 
which play a role in this process of reifica-
tion, writing tunnels into the research on 
infrastructure in general and their role in 
contexts of colonialism, insurgency and 
counter-insurgency in particular. It argues 
that tunnels emerged as an implicit 
response to Israeli policies of separation 
and control and the increasingly sophisti-
cated means used to realize these ends. 
The latter included approaches that 
actively embraced a ‘politics of verticality,’ 
incorporating a volume-based approach 
to Israeli geopolitical interests and 
designs, as opposed to horizontal/planar 
ones. Tunnels would reify an insurgent 
impetus on two fronts: vis-à-vis Israeli ide-
ological, political and military doctrines on 
the one hand, and the structured depen-
dency and ineffectiveness of Palestinian 
Authority (PA) on the other. Their emer-
gence speaks to the organization and 
coagulation of many externalities gener-
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ated by both dynamics, which effectively 
captured existent infrastructural assem-
blages toward colonial imperatives. The 
tunnel impetus is thus driven by a series of 
political, economic and class dynamics 
that Hamas is able to take advantage of 
despite not initiating.
 
While this accounting can only provide a 
cursory overview of these dialectical his-
torical processes, this article aims to draw 
more attention to the relational manner by 
which exogenous and endogenous fac-
tors lead to insurgent infrastructure devel-
opment under contexts of occupation and 
colonialism, and within a politics of verti-
cality as experienced by colonized/occu-
pied actors.
The Infrastructure Landscape under Israeli 
Colonialism
Situating Gaza’s tunnels on the infrastruc-
tural landscape of the occupied Palestinian 
territories (OPT) entails understanding 
how this landscape is produced and the 
policies and power dynamics that guide it. 
Eyal Weizman’s work reminds us that the 
various architects of Israel’s occupation—
state-technocrats, generals, archaeolo-
gists, planners and road engineers—con-
ceived of OPT space not as the background 
for their actions or “an abstract grid on 
which events take place – but rather the 
medium that each of their actions seeks to 
challenge, transform or appropriate” 
(Weizman Hollow 7). This approach was 
forged in the wake of the 1967 occupation 
whereupon the post-war reality forced 
Israel to reconcile the state’s self-definition 
as a “Jewish democratic state,” while de 
facto governing more than one million 
(non-Jewish) Palestinians in the newly 
occupied lands. Provision of citizenship to 
this population would erode the “Jewish 
character” of the state, while denial of citi-
zenship, its democratic character (Achcar 
205-222). The dominant Zionist Labor fac-
tion within the Israeli settler colonial move-
ment believed the answer to this dilemma 
could be found in an approach that aimed 
toward selectively disengaging from the 
immediate administration of Palestinian 
population centers, allowing for forms of 
Palestinian self-governance to arise there 
mediated through regional powers, 
Jordan in particular. But self-governance 
needed to be strictly controlled so as not 
to challenge Israeli prerogatives over land 
and resources, or broader ideological 
(Zionist), geostrategic, and economic 
interests. Thus a twin impetus behind 
Israel’s policies vis-à-vis the OPT was 
forged: the need to separate from the 
Palestinians, while simultaneously control-
ling them (Gordon Colonization).6 
In light of these guiding policy impera-
tives, Israel’s architects of occupation rei-
magined the OPT not “as a two-dimen-
sional surface, but as a large 
three-dimensional volume, layered with 
strategic, religious and political strata” 
(Weizman “Verticality”). By de facto impos-
ing a “politics of verticality” in their con-
ceptual and practical approaches to the 
OPT, these architects “crashed three-
dimensional space into six dimensions—
three Jewish and three Arab” (Benvenisti). 
This elasticized the frontiers of the conflict, 
unwittingly expanding them where resis-
tance to their plans could also be waged 
(Weizman Hollow 12-15). 
The infrastructural corollaries to these 
guiding Israeli policy frameworks primarily 
focused on developing Jewish-only colo-
nies, together with accompanying access 
roads and service centers. But they also 
entailed the active neglect of existing civil-
ian Palestinian infrastructure across the 
OPT, which were already dilapidated from 
the 1948-67 Egyptian/Jordanian periods. 
For example, despite Palestinians being 
forced to pay different taxes to the Israeli 
Civil Administration, not one hospital bed 
was added to the OPT health infrastruc-
ture between 1967 and 1994 (World Bank 
xiii).7 
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An important economic corollary to these 
policies also entailed the policy Sara Roy 
terms “de-development,” namely, “the 
negation of rational structural transforma-
tion, integration and synthesis” of Gaza’s 
economy, “obviating any organic congru-
ous, and logical arrangement” of its con-
stituent parts (Roy Gaza Strip  129–30). 
Accordingly, the majority of Gaza’s work-
ers were incorporated into the Israeli labor 
market or worked locally within service 
sectors, while Gaza’s own productive sec-
tors were prevented from being devel-
oped through Israeli control of land, water, 
skills and technology transfer, and trade 
policies. This created the enormous 
dependency Gaza would have upon 
Israeli jobs, and later, humanitarian aid.
While Weizman’s work explores the “three 
Jewish dimensions” of the occupation’s 
spatial frontier within the politics of verti-
cality, finding this in everything from clad-
ding to highway illumination schemes—
not to mention, a series of tunnels as 
well—sparse scholarly attention has been 
given to the “three Arab dimensions” 
(Weizman 12-15). But it is precisely in this 
domain that Gaza’s contemporary tunnel 
phenomenon must be seen. Because 
Israel’s approach toward the OPT and 
Gaza in particular was characterized by 
the politics of separation and control, 
while entrenching de-development, tun-
nels would emerge as an infrastructure 
that held a promise to circumvent and per-
haps even subvert both the occupation’s 
tentacles of control, while reconnecting its 
fragmented parts. This needed to be done 
below ground within the “three Arab 
dimensions” because the existing set of 
civilian infrastructure was subject to Israeli 
colonial imperatives and was already ‘cap-
tured,’ assembled and aligned to the lat-
ter’s broader geopolitical and geostrate-
gic logic.
It is important to emphasize that the emer-
gence of Gaza’s tunnel infrastructure was 
by no means linear. No one factor, party or 
decision led to Gaza’s tunnels assuming 
the formidable proportions that we see 
today. On the contrary, percolating con-
cerns and interests across various actors 
and times led to conditions conducive 
towards tunnel construction as alternative 
channels to existing political, infrastruc-
tural, economic and strategic constraints. 
In this light, it is inaccurate to portray the 
tunnel phenomenon as one of ‘Israel ver-
sus Hamas,’ though both sides have an 
interest in framing it as such. On the con-
trary, Hamas was not the first to construct 
tunnels in Gaza, and Israel is not the end 
destination of most tunnels. In fact, Gaza’s 
tunnels have been built by all political fac-
tions—Islamist and secular alike—as well as 
by politically unaffiliated individuals and 
clans. Some tunnels connect Gaza with 
Egypt, while others are directed at 
Israel/1948 Palestine areas, and still others 
remain exclusively within Gaza itself. And 
while some tunnels have indeed been 
purposed for military ends, the great 
majority of tunnels have been purposed 
for trade, storage, protection and move-
ment of people, goods and finance. 
An overview of some of the key historical 
turning points on this timeline will illus-
trate how the emergence of tunnels on 
the quantitative and qualitative propor-
tions seen today took decades to emerge, 
and only did so after the politics of control 
and separation would metastasize to 
extreme proportions within the politics of 
verticality. 
Historical Background
The earliest documented use of tunnels in 
the OPT can be traced to the case of 
Mohammed al-Aswad, a Palestinian mili-
tant from the leftist Popular Front for 
Liberation of Palestine, from Gaza’s largest 
(Jabaliya) refugee camp. Aswad is consid-
ered among the first to have successfully 
engaged in guerilla warfare from within 
Gaza post-1967 (and particularly its 
camps), earning him the title of “Guevara 
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Gaza,” or the man who ‘rules Gaza by 
night’ (Filiu 141). His successes were 
revealed to be partly attributed to his reli-
ance upon an escape tunnel and bunker 
located beneath a wealthy Gaza family 
home. While Aswad’s example would 
enter Palestinian resistance folklore, the 
reproduction of his example was hardly 
widespread. Israeli general and future 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon would crush 
the early 1970s Gaza rebellion Aswad led, 
while the PLO effectively deprioritized the 
OPT ‘front’ in favor of developing its 
regional headquarters in Jordan (up until 
1970) and Lebanon (until 1982) (Sayigh 
143-318). 
A more formative role in generating 
Palestinian experience with tunnels would 
emerge after the 1979 signing of the 
Egyptian-Israeli Camp David Accords, 
which led to the full re-demarcation of the 
Israeli-Egyptian border and the withdrawal 
of Israeli troops and settlers from the Sinai 
Peninsula in 1981. Palestinian residential 
settlement from the Gaza Strip’s southern-
most town and refugee camp (Rafah) had 
expanded onto the Egyptian side of the 
border between 1967 to 1981, extending 
along its 14 km length. Israel’s withdrawal 
to the pre-1967 line forced a process of 
partition that split families, as residents 
were forced to choose which side they 
would remain on. A ‘tunnel incentive’ was 
in turn born, motivated by the human 
need to reconnect families and an eco-
nomic incentive to capitalize on the differ-
ent economic regimes on either side. It 
should nonetheless be borne in mind that 
despite the border’s demarcation, nothing 
separated the Gaza Strip from the rest of 
territorial Palestine and the Israeli labor 
market, which continued to employ great 
numbers of Gaza’s laborers.8 Tunnels 
accordingly remained a marginal activity 
linked with petty smuggling efforts, but 
little more.
Closure and Oslo
The onset of the first intifada in 1987 would 
activate a new set of Israeli policy dimen-
sions that further laid the basis to Gaza’s 
tunneling impetus.
Israel’s policies designed to counter the 
first Palestinian intifada led to imposing a 
regime of closure across the OPT, prevent-
ing Palestinian movement and access 
between OPT areas and 1948 Palestine/
pre-1967 Israel, as well as between differ-
ent parts of the OPT itself (between Gaza, 
the West Bank and Jerusalem). The cre-
ation of the ‘pass’ system in January 1991 
reversed Israel’s policy maintained since 
1967 which had eliminated physical 
boundaries formally separating the OPT 
from 1948 areas, merging its labor and 
consumer markets (Hass “Israel’s Closure”).
While Israel justified—and continues to jus-
tify—its closure policies as being based on 
security exigencies, its first incarnations 
arose in January 1991, well before the 
spate of Palestinian suicide bombings in 
Israeli cities of the mid-1990s, which 
brought world attention to the issue and 
was used to retroactively justify it. Behind 
the security justification, however, lay a set 
of overlapping political and geostrategic 
interests related to Israel’s ‘Jewish demo-
cratic’ dilemma. Closure enabled Israel to 
demarcate the contours of its separation 
from Palestinians based on principles of 
‘maximum territory, minimum population,’ 
enabling it to preserve and consolidate its 
ideological, political, economic and secu-
rity interests (Shafir 238). The boundaries 
of this selective process of demarcation, 
tested over time, would subsequently 
consolidate in the 1993 Declaration of 
Principles (the Oslo Accord) and subse-
quent agreements9 signed between the 
PLO and Israel, establishing the delimited 
Palestinian autonomy zones that form the 
basis of the system of governance seen 
today across the OPT.
Without going too deeply into the history 
and details of the accords themselves, 
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whose political, territorial and economic 
dimensions have been extensively 
addressed by others (see Said; UNCTAD; 
Samhouri), let it suffice to say that Israel 
and the Western donor community main-
tained the commanding heights within the 
arrangement—financially, politically, and 
geostrategically—over the Palestinians, 
and continually used this vertical position-
ality to effectively leverage the Palestinian 
national leadership, institutions and soci-
ety (see Haddad).10 
The impact of this regime over the Gaza 
Strip were severe, and much greater than 
in the West Bank, given the former’s 
smaller size and resources, together with 
the systematic de-development the terri-
tory underwent since 1967, which was 
more extreme than other areas of the OPT 
(Roy The Gaza Strip; De-development; 
Failing Peace). The entire Strip was fenced 
in by 1995—the height of the peace pro-
cess—presaging efforts to do the same in 
the West Bank in 2002 after the second 
intifada had erupted. Movement of peo-
ple and goods, and access to lands, eco-
nomic opportunities, social services and 
the outside world, were tightly controlled 
by Israel as the ultimate political and mili-
tary arbiter of Palestinian affairs. Internally, 
the Strip was further divided into four sec-
tions cut off from one another through the 
imposition of Israel’s own settler colonial 
infrastructure (PCHR “Gaza Settlements”). 
Gaza’s relatively flat seaside topography 
also facilitated easier security arrange-
ments to these installations insofar as the 
army enjoyed long lines of sight and visi-
bility of surrounding activity. 
Most importantly, closure led to loss of the 
Israeli labor market for thousands of work-
ers in Gaza, causing unemployment rates 
and poverty to soar.11 Gaza’s economy was 
woefully unprepared to absorb the huge 
swell of unemployed, forcing the PA to 
employ many as civil servants (paid for by 
the donor community), and hiding them 
from official unemployment rosters. This 
practice was willingly sanctioned by 
Western donors because they wished to 
preserve the momentum of the peace 
process itself, rather than confront Israel 
about the principles and aims of closure 
(Haddad 260-280). Separation, in fact, had 
been supported by donors because it was 
seen as a ‘step towards peace’ despite the 
fact that Israel’s implementation of this 
principle through closure “laid the corner-
stone” of apartheid, as noted by seasoned 
Israeli journalist Amira Hass (Hass, “26 
Years”).12 
Within this arrangement, the PA had lim-
ited political or financial maneuverability 
and was expected by donors and Israel to 
act as the indigenous corollary to Israeli 
security prerogatives. Tensions of all 
stripes abounded within this arrangement, 
laying the basis for conditions that would 
eventually explode during the second inti-
fada. Yet while the arrangement was preg-
nant with contradictions, its externalities 
were left entirely unorganized, despite 
major consequences on all aspects of 
Palestinian life and livelihood. The PA was 
nonetheless institutionally and financially 
bound within the existing arrangement 
and prioritized its survival within this asym-
metry, rather than challenging its logic 
overall.
Second Intifada and “Disengagement”
When the peace process eventually col-
lapsed after the failed Camp David sum-
mit of July 2000, the eruption of a second 
intifada would set the stage for the con-
temporary tunnel experiment to grow. The 
intifada quickly revealed how most of the 
“old” forms of struggle against the occu-
pation used during the first intifada—
strikes, popular demonstrations and the 
formation of popular committees to self-
organize communities—were now largely 
obsolete. Oslo’s reconfiguration of Israel’s 
occupation map meant that Israeli soldiers 
were no longer situated within the heart of 
most Palestinian cities, while the existence 
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of the PA meant that Palestinians nomi-
nally controlled many of their own social 
services, but could not operate these with-
out Israeli and donors’ approval and 
finance. The arrangement exposed how 
the Palestinian governance apparatus that 
Palestinians entrusted with realizing their 
political and national aspirations, and 
which donors had financed, was structur-
ally incapable of subverting its asymmetric 
positioning. Nor could it effectively 
address the hardships of life this arrange-
ment necessarily entailed, subject as it was 
to Israeli and donor prerogatives. 
Collectively these factors pushed conflict 
dynamics towards militarization, espe-
cially in light of soaring Palestinian pro-
tester casualty rates, easily picked off by 
Israeli soldiers located in well-protected 
military facilities at the gateways to 
Palestinian cities and towns (OCHA 
“Casualties”; B’tselem).
On its behalf, Israel’s attempts to militarily 
quash the second intifada led to immedi-
ate measures to leverage its position of 
verticality, further tightening its means of 
separation and control, and increasingly 
investing in technologies of surveillance 
and obstacle construction (walls, trenches, 
checkpoints, earthen barriers) (UNOCHA 
“Movement and Access”). Gaza would 
increasingly become locked down to 
human traffic (both within the strip and 
vis-a-vis the rest of the OPT and outside 
world), hermetically sealing each section 
in a manner that had no equivalent in the 
West Bank. Israel could close Gaza's 
checkpoints for weeks on end and com-
pletely paralyze all economic and social 
activity that depended on inter-regional 
connectivity throughout the Strip—to say 
nothing of movement and access beyond 
Gaza. It also began to implement military 
doctrines that saw value in assassinating 
charismatic Palestinian leaders through 
strikes from drones and attack helicopters 
on cars, apartments and homes (PCHR 
“Assassination”). All territory above 
ground became a potential target for 
such attacks as Israeli military superiority 
from the air, together with its extensive 
intelligence apparatuses on the ground, 
gave it enormous abilities to pinpoint 
Palestinian actors, while controlling eco-
nomic and personnel flows. To further 
leverage its advantageous positioning, 
Israel also worked to extensively widen 
buffering perimeters around settlements 
and military bases, beginning massive 
house demolition and land clearing cam-
paigns using bulldozers and aerial defo-
liation spray (PCHR “Home Demolition”). 
Israel’s military superiority would be no 
match for the second intifada’s early 
experiments in armed struggle, which 
were of limited scope and sophistication, 
and led to heavy losses. 
Incentivizing Tunnels
As the dialectics of military engagement 
evolved, the sophistication of Israel’s tech-
nological advantages over Palestinians 
widened, and the rejectionist logic of 
Israeli political and strategic doctrines 
became more evident and entrenched—
that there would be no political conces-
sions to the intifada, and that “what doesn’t 
work with force will work with more force” 
(Benn; Honig-Parnass 230)13—Palestinian 
political and military actors would slowly 
look towards a range of technologies—
including tunnels—that might be able to 
provide primitive solutions to some of the 
new and old problems this situation 
posed. 
Tunnels would be intimately tied with an 
emergent set of political and economic 
interests to create an alternative to the 
existing avenues that were blocked or 
controlled by the conditionalities of Oslo 
and Israeli political and military doctrines, 
and which were left effectively unchal-
lenged by Western donors. 
As Israel invested in securing its installa-
tions in Gaza from attack, Palestinian mili-
tants considered ways to strike these tar-
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gets from a distance given their 
impenetrability on land. Efforts to develop 
mortars and primitive rocket technology 
began appearing in Gaza in 2001, 
imported in part through skills transfer 
from former senior PLO militants them-
selves and Palestinians linked to external 
networks sympathetic to supporting this 
activity (Hizbulla, Iraq, Iran and Libya). 
Materials needed to sustain military activ-
ity against Israel had initially relied upon 
the Israeli black market for supplies and 
weapons. But with Israel tightening all 
channels of movement and access into 
and within the OPT, Egyptian markets 
would begin to prove more cost-effective. 
The Sinai Peninsula was awash in small 
weapons easily penetrated by smuggling 
networks. Local Egyptians were also eco-
nomically marginalized from the Egyptian 
seat of governance and were largely alien-
ated from the profitable tourism resorts 
owned by government officials and 
wealthy capitalists, built on Sinai’s pristine 
coasts, particularly in the poorer northern 
parts closer to Gaza. These areas of Sinai 
began deepening economic ties to the 
Gaza Strip, developing a border economy 
organized around military supply. 
While only a handful of tunnels existed 
along Rafah’s border up until 2000—with 
this representing the entirety of Gaza’ 
known tunnel infrastructure at the time—
the incentive to dig new tunnels to coun-
ter-leverage Israeli vertical hegemony 
would increasingly emerge as a conse-
quence of an overlapping set of eco-
nomic, political and military incentives that 
sustained a maturing militant resistance 
economy. Additionally, it should be noted, 
the south of the Gaza Strip was much 
poorer than its northern parts, where Gaza 
City’s patrician family structures closely 
associated with the PA (even more so than 
those of the West Bank), had long inte-
grated into local and regional capital 
accumulation patterns and networks (Hilal 
85-115). This economic and political mar-
ginalization also fueled Rafah’s gaze 
southwards (toward Sinai) and under-
ground, as opposed to over ground, as 
the few economic opportunities that 
Palestinians had under Oslo and closure 
were dominated by preferred capital 
groups associated with the PA. These 
groups had no interest in the develop-
ment of tunnels, because they benefitted 
from monopoly-like concessions on 
imports into PA areas, through the official 
channels, as junior partners to the Israeli-
dominated arrangement. In this way, 
Gaza’s civilian infrastructure was revealed 
as doubly captured, servicing Israeli colo-
nial prerogatives and military doctrines, as 
well as those of favored Palestinian elites 
profiteering within the PA’s survivalist 
approach to politics overall.
Thus, political factors (opposition/lack of 
faith in Oslo) would combine with eco-
nomic incentives (the profits of smug-
gling) and political economic factors (dis-
enfranchisement of local actors under 
Oslo, and within Palestinian social rela-
tions) to synergize the tunnel impetus.
Tunnels slowly became pronounced as a 
viable and effective military tactic in their 
own right, as they provided militants with 
the opportunity to approach Israeli targets 
without detection. The first incidence of 
this took place in September 2001 when 
Hamas militants burrowed beneath the 
hated ‘Termid’ military installation in Rafah, 
which overlooked the strategic Salaheddin 
road, blowing it up and killing five sol-
diers. At least five other operations using 
tunnels for detonation or ambush (killing 
15 soldiers and injuring 67) made it appar-
ent that Israel’s military presence in secure 
installations throughout Gaza was now not 
so secure (Sham’a). The simultaneous 
onset of daily rocket and mortar fire into 
these areas—surrounded as they were by 
populated Palestinian areas—rang a death 
knell for the former arrangement. Israel 
was forced to internalize a more efficient 
and effective arrangement to dominating 
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Gaza, withdrawing its army, 5000 settlers 
and 21 settlements from within the territo-
rial borders of Gaza, and repositioning 
troops at a safer distance beyond. In 
December 2003, then prime minister Ariel 
Sharon would politically declare his inten-
tion to withdraw, announcing his “Gaza 
disengagement” plan.
The “Gaza disengagement,” which in truth 
was a unilateral redeployment, only 
strengthened Israeli control over the Strip. 
It reorganized the features and means of 
separation and control, attempting to 
establish and administer it remotely. 
Helga Tawil-Souri refers to the new regime 
structure to emerge there as akin to a 
“digital occupation” whereby unmanned 
aerial reconnaissance and attack drones, 
remote-controlled machine guns, closed-
circuit television, sonic imagery, gamma-
radiation detectors, remote-controlled 
bulldozers and boats, and electrified 
fences marked a shift from traditional mil-
itary occupation toward a high-tech one 
(Tawil-Souri). For Tawil-Souri, “the techno-
logical sealing of Gaza is part of the trans-
formation  of the mechanics of Israeli 
occupation toward ‘frictionless’ control” 
(28). This logistical feat would comple-
ment its political equivalent, whereby the 
redeployment was construed by its Israeli 
architects as a form of political and insti-
tutional “formaldehyde,” quoting Sharon 
senior advisor Dov Weisglas (Shavit).14 
‘Disengagement’ gave Israel the opportu-
nity to falsely claim that it had ended its 
occupation and was no longer responsi-
ble for the territory’s fate. In truth, it 
entrenched and metastasized the princi-
ples of the previous arrangement—control 
and separation—doing so in a manner that 
was exponentially more exclusivist, vio-
lent and domineering. It also whetted the 
illusion that control and separation could 
be achieved through an unending series 
of technological fixes of yet higher verti-
cal orders.
Post-Disengagement
Israel’s redeployment from Gaza, Hamas’ 
victory in the 2006 elections, and the inter-
national boycott on dealing directly with 
the new government represented the ulti-
mate tipping point in the drawn-out affair 
of tunnel development.
The international and Israeli responses to 
democratic elections exposed these pow-
ers as less committed to democracy and 
institution building than they were to 
sponsorship of political patronage in the 
form of Fatah control over the PA. 
Furthermore, the US' attempted sponsor-
ship of a failed coup against Hamas in 
June 2007, through former Fatah strong-
man Mohammed Dahlan, resulted in a 
geopolitical division between a Fatah-
controlled West Bank and a Hamas-
controlled Gaza Strip (Rose). The brazen 
political nature of both events exposed 
the extreme measures donors and Israel 
were willing to take in attempting to pre-
vent the emergence of alternative arrange-
ments that disaggregated or even loos-
ened their vertically-imposed political, 
economic and infrastructural hegemony. 
The capture of civilian infrastructure would 
not be surrendered to the new Palestinian 
government, but used instead as a means 
of leverage, given that it ultimately relied 
upon forms of physical and financial 
access to operate, which Israel and donors 
controlled. The further collapse of infra-
structure and humanitarian conditions in 
Gaza was inevitable thereafter, to say 
nothing of what would become of these in 
light of Israel’s military campaigns against 
Gaza in 2008, 2009, 2012, and 2014 (UN).
These dynamics would subsequently push 
Hamas, as the Gaza Strip’s new governors, 
to strategically adopt its own radical 
means of realizing its agenda, which in the 
end was an existential test of the organiza-
tion, its personnel, leadership and pro-
gram. Tunnel infrastructure development 
would lead the way forward for the move-
ment to survive, as democratic elections 
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failed to release the existing civil infra-
structure from Israeli, donor and PA cap-
ture. However primitive, tunnels offered 
the only effective means by which its alter-
native political agenda could take shape 
within existing constraints. These dynam-
ics in turn represented the formal organi-
zation and crystallization of logical ten-
dencies to survive and counter the Israeli, 
international donor and PA regime con-
straints.
Hundreds of tunnels under Gaza’s soils 
would thereafter be dug—up to 1500 
according to some estimates—with these 
directed southward towards Egypt 
(Pelham). These routes became known as 
“Gaza’s lungs” or “veins,” just as Israeli 
military campaigns expressly intended to 
send Gaza back to the “Middle Ages” 
(Mitchell), and by 2014, the “Stone Age” 
(Regev). Nicholas Pelham documents this 
phenomenal rise, noting how “tunnels 
became a key driver of upward mobility 
and social change, empowering previ-
ously marginalized groups and spawning 
a class of nouveaux riches” (Pelham 20).15 
Hamas would use tunnels to establish its 
own elites within a new political economy, 
consolidating its rule. The rents generated 
would give the organization the financial 
means to deepen its political hold over 
the Strip, definitively displacing the old 
Fatah-aligned elites there while also allow-
ing the organization to pursue its military 
ambitions without encumbrance from PA 
security personnel and Western donor 
state influence. 
Tunnels would further prove themselves 
as militarily effective, demonstrated in the 
2006 ambushing and capturing of Israeli 
soldier Gilad Shalit. Shalit was taken from 
his military vehicle located on Gaza’s bor-
ders after militants emerged from a tunnel 
that opened behind Israeli-held lines. His 
capture eventually resulted in the release 
of 1050 Palestinian political prisoners, 
many of whom were both long-serving 
and political leaders. The fact that a tunnel 
proved so effective in coercing Israel to 
release Palestinian political prisoners 
entrenched the politics of resistance over 
those of negotiations within the opera-
tional logic of Palestinian political actors. 
The basis for the reductionist narrative 
around tunnels expressed at the begin-
ning of this article was thus laid.
Concluding Thoughts
Although contemporary discourse on 
tunnels is dominated by the narratives of 
Israeli military spokesmen and Palestinian 
military factions, this article has attempted 
to demonstrate that these accountings 
represent a narrow reading of this phe-
nomenon that tends to reproduce reduc-
tionist tropes about the conflict. A more 
nuanced reading exposes how this infra-
structure harnessed a survivalist impetus 
under increasingly repressive condition 
that would later become more explicitly 
insurgent. Because the Oslo peace pro-
cess failed to challenge the insipient 
logic of Israel’s approach toward the OPT, 
characterized by the twin dynamics of 
control and separation, Palestinian actors 
eventually pursued alternative and paral-
lel political, economic, and ultimately 
infrastructural avenues to the captured 
versions on offer.
Israeli and donor intransigence through-
out the peace process and the intifada 
effectively assumed that technological 
fixes and the politics of verticality could 
indefinitely contain the contradictions and 
externalities their policies generated. But 
as the old adage goes, “if you don’t bend, 
you break”—and Gaza effectively “broke.” 
Tunnels acted as a key infrastructural tech-
nology and contribution that could reify 
alternative political, economic, social and 
indeed military impetuses.  In so doing, 
they played a part in loosening, at the very 
least, the monopolistic, self-referential 
frameworks for how Israeli-Palestinian 
“conflict resolution” had taken place within 
the peace process, as overseen by Israel 
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and Western donors. Accordingly, rudi-
mentary activities formerly on the margins 
of Palestinian economic and military activ-
ity were given the opportunity to expand, 
as the economic, military and political 
conditions and dynamics synergized these 
dimensions between themselves. Hamas 
became the political and institutional 
benefactor of these dynamics, despite the 
movement not initiating them. 
In particular, Israeli doctrines implement-
ing a Zionist variant of apartheid across 
the OPT should be identified as a chief 
facilitator of these dynamics, as they 
separated families, regions, economic 
actors and infrastructure of all stripes, 
without recourse. Additionally the imposi-
tion of military doctrines of uncompromis-
ing force, ‘full-spectrum dominance,’ 
attempted omniscience, and “frictionless” 
remote control pushed forward local mili-
tary dynamics. The particular asymmetrical 
manner by which these dynamics were 
asserted on the ground, together with the 
widening nature of this asymmetry over 
time, should also be credited with pushing 
further resources towards this end. The 
reification of these dynamics through the 
burgeoning tunnel phenomenon would 
thus inevitably align itself within Palestinian 
social relations and its respective political 
and class struggles. 
Palestinians used tunnels in Gaza as a 
means to re-stitch their territories and lives 
while attempting to generate means of 
survival and forms of leverage that could 
stave off Israel’s destructive policies 
toward them. This article demonstrates 
how infrastructure functions as an impor-
tant frontier in the conflict, with respective 
political economic alignments, political 
discourses, financial actors, military 
dimensions and strategic ends. It thus con-
tributes to an academic literature set on 
the vertical that both answers Stephen 
Elden’s challenge to “look up” from below, 
rather than merely to understand things 
from above, looking down (Elden 49). As 
Stephen Graham notes, thanks to the pro-
liferating verticalities of our world overall, 
“it is only through such fully three-dimen-
sional and critical perspectives that the 
political, social and urban struggles of our 
rapidly urbanizing world can possibly be 
understood” (Graham 24). A call for more 
case studies of the role of infrastructure 
within the politics of verticality within con-
texts of occupation and colonialism, resis-
tance and counter insurgency, can help 
shed light on still more dimensions to 
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possible without ovens. Fresh 
food is hard to sell without 
refrigerators. Crops cannot 
be irrigated without water 
pumps, and fishing boats are 
difficult to sail without fuel. 
Commercial companies in 
Gaza reported a 30% surge 
in production costs due to 
disruptions in the supply of 
electricity. This is the daily 
routine” (GISHA “Hand” 3).
3 Vietnam’s population was 
42 million people in 1970, 
while Gaza’s today has only 
just passed two million.
4 Fishman takes the figure 
from the Israeli Comptroller’s 
Report produced in the 
wake of Israel’s 2014 military 
campaign in Gaza, and 
which intended to assess 
the army’s performance and 
preparedness therein.
Notes
1 GISHA – Legal Center for 
Freedom of Movement.
2 Just one paragraph from 
the report is worth quoting 
to gain a sense of the extent 
of Gaza’s infrastructure crisis 
and its implications on civilian 
life: “Without a consistent 
supply of electricity, it is 
impossible to provide 
sufficient health, education 
and welfare services. Some 
medical equipment is prone 
to frequent malfunctions 
due to unstable electrical 
currents, while other 
equipment cannot be used at 
all as it cannot withstand the 
fluctuations in the current. It 
is difficult to keep medicine 
chilled. Untreated sewage 
gets discharged into the 
sea, and without the ability 
to use pumps, water supply 
is affected. Household 
appliances like refrigerators 
or washing machines cannot 
be used, not to mention 
air conditioning in summer 
or heating in winter. With 
an intermittent supply of 
fuel, public transportation 
becomes unreliable and 
hospitals, schools and 
universities have difficulties 
operating. The industrial and 
agricultural sectors, including 
food production, are also 
harmed due to energy 
deficiencies. Baking is not 
5 Israeli spokeswoman Lt. 
Libby Weiss from the Israeli 
Army Spokesperson‘s Unit 
for example, provides a 
“guided tour inside a Hamas 
terror tunnel” in a YouTube 
video declaring “These are 
tunnels that are built with 
high quality cement—cement 
that comes into Gaza from 
Israel as humanitarian aid. 
On average, every one of 
these tunnels costs roughly 
three million dollars. Multiply 
that by the number of 
tunnels we found and that 
comes to US$100 million that 
could have been invested 
in schools, community 
centers, in hospitals, in 
mosques within the Gaza 
strip. This tunnel and others 
like it, clearly reflect Hamas’ 
priorities: rather than invest 
time and resources in the 
population of Gaza, Hamas 
instead chooses to invest 
in acts of terror against the 
Israeli public. This is the true 
face of Hamas.” (IDF)
6 The main tenets of this 
plan are attributed to former 
Israeli Defence Minister 
Yigal Allon, and have since 
rendered various maximalist 
and minimalist versions. 
But the basic principle of 
containing the Palestinian 
demographic presence 
within defined areas of 
limited self-governance 
while maintaining the rest of 
the territory for settlement 
expansion has been a 
prominent feature of all 
Israeli governments at least 
since 1993.
7 The report notes: 
“Government health care 
services are produced at 14 
hospitals and 165 primary 
health care clinics. The 14 
hospitals had a total of 
1,546 beds in 1990. Most 
government clinics are 
fully staffed for only one 
or two days a week. The 
Civil Administration has not 
increased the number of 
beds in government hospitals 
since 1967.” For more on the 
state of infrastructure in the 
OPT, see World Bank, vol V; 
Roy, Gaza Strip.
8 Before the 1994 Interim 
arrangements, around 
115,000 Palestinians—roughly 
30% of the labor force in the 
West Bank and more than 
40% in Gaza, legally worked 
in Israel (Beinin 29).
9 These Israel-PA agreements 
included the Oslo II Interim 
Agreement of 1995, the Paris 
Economic Agreement of 
1994, the Hebron Protocol 
of 1997, and the Wye River 
Memorandum of 1998.
––›
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12 It is worth quoting 
Hass in full: “Since 1991, 
the denial of freedom of 
movement [of Palestinians] 
has only become more 
technologically sophisticated: 
separate roads, checkpoints 
and search methods that 
are more humiliating and 
time-consuming; routine 
biometric identification; 
an infrastructure that 
enables a restoration of the 
checkpoints around the West 
Bank enclaves and separates 
them from each other. The 
calculated gradualness and 
failure to announce the policy 
and its objective in advance, 
and the internal closure of 
the Palestinian enclaves 
surrounded by Area C – all of 
these normalize the situation. 
Closure (as a foundation of 
apartheid) is perceived as the 
natural, permanent state, the 
standard people no longer 
notice” (Hass “26 Years”).
10 Israeli activist Jeff Halper 
has termed the nature of 
Israeli control of the OPT as 
akin to a “matrix of control” 
that operates similar to the 
Japanese game of ‘Go’: 
“Instead of defeating your 
opponent as in chess, in Go 
you win by immobilizing 
your opponent, by gaining 
control of key points of a 
matrix so that every time s/
he moves s/he encounters 
an obstacle of some kind 
[. . .] The matrix imposed 
by Israel in the West Bank, 
Gaza and East Jerusalem, 
similar in appearance to a Go 
board, has virtually paralyzed 
the Palestinian population 
without ‘defeating’ it or 
even conquering much 
territory (Halper 15). Israel 
and donor states have also 
always controlled at least 
two thirds of PA revenue 
streams, together with the 
political parameters of what 
constitutes actions supportive 
or detrimental to ‘peace’. 
11 During the heavy full 
closures imposed in 1996-97, 
these figures dropped to 18 
and 6 percent respectively, 
spiking Palestinian 
unemployment to around 20 
and 30 percent (Arnon 589).
13 Honig-Parnass quotes an 
interview with Israeli Army 
Chief of Staff Moshe Ya’alon 
describing his approach 
to repressing the Al Aqsa 
Intifada. Ya’alon likens the 
intifada to “cancer” and 
the Israeli army’s approach 
to repressing it as akin to 
applying chemotherapy: 
“The facts that are being 
determined in this 
confrontation—in terms of 
what will be burned into the 
Palestinian consciousness—
are fateful. If we end this 
confrontation in a way 
that makes it clear to all 
Palestinians that terrorism 
does not lead to agreements, 
it will improve our strategic 
position. On the other hand, 
if their feeling at the end of 
the confrontation is that they 
can defeat us, our situation 
will become more and more 
difficult.”
14 “The disengagement is 
actually formaldehyde,” said 
Weisglas. “It supplies the 
amount of formaldehyde that 
is necessary so there will not 
be a political process with the 
Palestinians.” (Shavit).
15 Pelham’s article is based on 
a study the United Nations 
commissioned on Gaza’s 
tunnels but failed to publish.
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